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According to some authors, perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees an
F” are sometimes intensional, in that they can be true without there being
an F.1 The claim that there are intensional perceptual ascriptions (or IPAs)
is not without opponents, but the critics’ arguments are addressed in a re-
cent article in this journal (Bourget 2017a). In this paper, I take it as read
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1Authors who hold this view include Moore (1905), Ayer (1940), Smythies (1956),
Anscombe (1965), Hintikka (1969), Coburn (1977), Harman (1990), Chomsky (1995, p.
52), Moltmann (2008), Brogaard (2012, 2015), and myself (2017a).
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that there are IPAs. I am interested in the implications that the existence of
IPAs has for current philosophical theories of perceptual experience.2 I first
defend three theses regarding IPAs: I) IPAs ascribe phenomenal properties;
II) perceptual verbs are not ambiguous between intensional and extensional
readings; III) IPAs have a relational form. I then argue that theses I-III
support and reconcile versions of relationalism, disjunctivism, and represen-
tationalism. While supportive of the main theories of perceptual experience,
theses I-III do not directly support particularism, the view that we experi-
ence external objects. I conclude with a brief discussion of the status of this
claim in the context of theses I-III.
1 Intensional perceptual ascriptions
This section mostly summarizes relevant material from an article recently
published in this journal (Bourget 2017a). Readers interested in more details
or arguments should find this article helpful.
A perceptual ascription is a token statement of the form “α φ-s S,” where
α is the subject, φ is a perceptual verb (“see,” “hear,” “smell,” “taste,” “feel,” or
“perceive”), and S is the direct object of the verb. For example, “I see a flower”
is a perceptual ascription. An intensional perceptual ascription (IPA) is a
perceptual ascription token that states a proposition that is existence-neutral
2IPAs were once thought to support sense-datum theories of perception, but this mis-
conception was corrected by Harman (1990). I don’t talk about sense-datum theories in
this paper because hardly anyone holds such views today (see Bourget & Chalmers 2014).
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with respect to the names and existential quantifiers occurring within S, in
that these names and quantifiers do not have their normal existential import.3
Extensional perceptual ascriptions (EPAs) are perceptual ascription tokens
that are not intensional.
IPAs are ascriptions that state existence-neutral propositions, not merely
ascriptions that convey or communicate such propositions. There is consider-
able disagreement on how to best account for the difference between stating
and conveying. Nonetheless, we seem to have a fairly good intuitive grip on
the distinction. In conversational implicatures, for example, it is clear that
what is stated is distinct from what is conveyed.
Many authors have offered examples of alleged IPAs.4 Statements (1)-(5)
are examples from the scientific literature on perceptual anomalies, which
should be untainted by philosophical views.
(1) “[...] patients have hallucinatory perceptions ranging from seeing
shapes and colors to vivid scenes that involve people and animals.”
(Prerost et al., 2014)
(2) “Auditory hallucinations typically involve hearing voices [...]” (First
et al., 1997)
(3) “Also known as phantosmia, olfactory hallucinations involve smelling
3In addition to existence neutrality, two other “marks of intensionality” are often recog-
nized: referential opacity and non-specificity. However, the three “marks of intensionality”
come apart in many ways (Coburn 1977; Forbes, 2006, 2008, 2002), so it is best to choose
one mark as definitional. I choose existence-neutrality because it is most relevant to my
arguments.
4See footnote 1.
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odors that are not derived from any physical stimulus.” (Ali et al.,
2011)
(4) “In my mouth I could taste something like phenic acid.” (Blanke and
Landis, 2003)
(5) “They feel insects on the hands and arms.” (Brown et al., 1916)
In these utterances, the speakers seem to be stating that certain things are
perceived without implying that these things exist. These utterances seem
to be IPAs.
While the preceding utterances are most naturally read as IPAs, per-
ceptual ascriptions can also be given extensional readings. Indeed, most
perceptual ascriptions are naturally given extensional readings. In what fol-
lows, I will use an “i” or “e” subscript on the perceptual verb to indicate that
an intensional or extensional reading is intended.
Austin (1962, p. 91), Dretske (1969, pp. 44-49), Grice (1989, p. 44), and
Soames (2003, p. 184) question the existence of IPAs. All four argue that
apparent IPAs can be explained away as instances of conveying an existence-
neutral proposition by stating a non-existence-neutral proposition, which is
all that a perceptual ascription ever states. The best worked out version
of this view, suggested by Dretske, Grice, and Soames, is that every ap-
parent IPAs is a case in which one conveys that it seems or appears to a
subject that the subject is perceivinge something by stating that the subject
is perceivinge something. The speaker is taken to want to convey the qual-
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ified claim in virtue of features of the context. The qualification accounts
for the intensionality of the ascription: from the fact that it seems to you
that you seee an elephant, it does not follow that there is an elephant. I will
refer to this as the unstated qualification view of IPAs. The key difference
between this view and the one that I (and other proponents of IPAs) defend
is that, on this view, the existence-neutral proposition is merely conveyed,
not stated.
One important consideration against the unstated qualification view is
that IPAs have substantive implications regarding the phenomenal character
of the subject’s experience, whereas EPAs do not. For example, suppose that
one utters (6) in the context of talking about the effects of a drug.
(6) I see a pink elephant.
In this case, one clearly conveys (and states) something substantive about
the phenomenal character of one’s experience (that it is in some way pinkish
and elephantine). Clearly, the reason for uttering (6) is to convey something
about one’s phenomenology.
Compare this with a case in which the extensional reading of (6) is in-
tended. Suppose, for example, that you are searching for pink-painted ele-
phants that have escaped from the circus. Suppose that you are looking for
the elephants at night using infrared goggles, which make everything look
green. If you were to spot one of the elephants, you could correctly utter (6)
meaning that you seee a pink elephant. In this case, you do not convey nor
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state that you are having a pinkish-elephantine experience. This is problem-
atic for the unstated qualification view because, on this view, an alleged IPA
of the form of (6) is supposed to convey what a claim such as (7) states.
(7) It seems to me that I seee a pink elephant.
Since the extensional ascription embedded in (7) does not state that one
has a pinkish or elephantine experience, the whole statement does not state
anything regarding pinkish or elephantine experiences (though it states some-
thing regarding pink elephants). So the unstated qualification view cannot
account for what alleged IPAs convey about phenomenology.
The unstated qualification view has a problem in the other direction as
well: it predicts that IPAs state more than they in fact state. The prob-
lem is that (7) states a certain epistemic fact that is not stated (and not
always conveyed) by (6) on its intensional reading, namely, that one has a
certain kind of evidence for the presence of a pink elephant. It is not hard
to imagine one making a claim such as (6) without thinking that one has
any evidence whatsoever for the presence of a pink elephant. For example,
one might have full confidence that experiences of pink elephants are always
hallucinatory. Similar issues arise for other ways of qualifying extensional
perceptual ascriptions.
The preceding are but two of the multiple objections to the unstated
qualification view raised by Bourget 2017a. Since I am taking it as read that
there are genuine IPAs for the purposes of this paper, I won’t discuss other
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objections here.
Some of the critics of IPAs assume that if perceptual ascriptions can state
either existence-neutral propositions or non-existence-neutral propositions,
perceptual verbs must be lexically ambiguous (c.f. Dretske 1969, pp. 44-9;
Austin 1962, p. 91). But a little reflection shows that it is not obvious
that the existence of IPAs implies a lexical ambiguity. There is at least
one plausible alternative on which the difference between intensional and
extensional readings of perceptual ascriptions is at the level of proposition
structure or logical form rather than word meaning. Specifically, EPAs have
the overall form of (8) at some level of abstraction, whereas IPAs have the
form of (9), where q is a quantifier of some sort.
(8) qx(φ(α,__x__))
(9) φ(α,__qx__)
We can distinguish two forms of perceptual ascriptions allowing intensional
readings: clausal ascriptions, in which the object of the verb is a clause (e.g. a
bare infinitive clause (10) or a participial clause (11)), and NP ascriptions,
in which the object of the verb is a noun phrase (12, 13).
(10) I see [ a triangle turn ].
(11) I see [ a triangle turning ].
(12) I see [ a triangle ].
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(13) I see [ triangles ].
I have suggested that clausal ascriptions that allow intensional readings plau-
sibly express relationships to propositions. A clausal ascription is ambiguous
between an intensional and an extensional reading when it contains a quan-
tified noun phrase that can be read as introducing a variable either inside
(intensional) or outside (extensional) the propositional argument of the verb.5
In the case of NP ascriptions, two main views are available: propositionalism,
which takes them to also express relations to propositions, and Montagovian
views of NP complements, which take them to express relations to inten-
sions for generalized quantifiers (or similar entities). On the propositionalist
view, the scope distinction for NP ascriptions works the same way as for
clausal ascriptions. The Montagovian view introduces several technicalities
that complicate things, but the principle is the same: expressions such as (12)
are structurally ambiguous in that, as far as surface syntax is concerned, the
quantifier introduced by the quantified NP can take either wide or narrow
scope. The main motivations for the foregoing account are that 1) it is a sim-
ple application of received views of other intensional constructions and 2) it
can explain all the most striking differences that we find between intensional
and extensional readings, including differences in existence-neutrality, opac-
ity, and specificity (see Bourget 2017a for details). More evidence for this
scopal account of the intensional/extensional distinction will be introduced
5In Bourget 2017a, I suggest that names only give rise to IPAs when they are QNPs in
disguise. I touch on this issue below.
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below.
2 IPAs and phenomenal consciousness
In the preceding section, we noted in passing that a subject’s seeing an
F, on the intensional reading, seems to entail that the subject is having
a phenomenal experience with a phenomenology that has something to do
with F-ness. For example, if one is seeingi a pink elephant, there is something
pinkish and elephantine about the phenomenal character of one’s experience.
This points to a connection between IPAs and phenomenal consciousness.
This section aims to shed more light on this connection. I begin by clarifying
the language that I use to talk about phenomenal consciousness.
Intuitively, phenomenal consciousness is the “what it’s like” aspect of
mental states. Examples of mental states that exhibit phenomenal conscious-
ness include perceptual episodes, bodily sensations, emotional feelings, and
(arguably) occurrent thoughts. A phenomenal property is a property that
captures a certain “what it’s like.” On this understanding of phenomenal
properties, they are individuated by what it’s like to have them: two phe-
nomenal properties are the same just in case what it’s like to have them
is the same. Phenomenal properties are also sometimes called “phenomenal
states.”
Philosophers normally use the noun “experience” to mean something along
the lines of an instantiation of a phenomenal property. It is important to be
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aware that this use of “experience,” while perfectly clear and intelligible to the
initiated, is not in line with the ordinary meaning of the term. In ordinary
English, an experience is an encounter or event, or something that happens to
oneself.6 On this understanding of “experience,” experiences have little to do
with phenomenal consciousness. For example, an experience of poverty or an
experience of a red ball need not be a phenomenal event. Even phenomenally
experiencing a red ball, in this sense of “experience,” is not the same as
what philosophers mean by “experiencing a red ball”: the former is merely a
matter of encountering a red ball in consciousness, which is consistent with
the ball looking blue or square (or both), whereas experiencing a red ball
in philosophers’ sense is simply a matter of instantiating a certain reddish
phenomenal property.
My aim for the rest of this section is to make a case for the thesis that
IPAs ascribe phenomenal properties. We can put this thesis a little more
precisely as follows:
Thesis I: IPAs are pure phenomenal ascriptions.
A pure phenomenal ascription is an utterance that states a proposition that
simply ascribes a phenomenal property to an individual. In other words, the
utterance states a proposition that can be stated by a statement of the form
“x has a visual/auditory/etc. experience of y” as normally understood by
6The preceding is a close paraphrase of the entry for the noun “experience” in Ox-
ford Dictionary of English (revised edition), ed. Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson
(Oxford University Press, 2005).
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philosophers.7 Thesis I is considerably stronger than the observation with
which I started this section: not only is phenomenal consciousness involved
in intensional seeing, but intensional seeing is nothing but a matter of phe-
nomenal consciousness.
From this point on, it becomes important to bear in mind a potential
variation in the meanings of perceptual verbs distinct from any potential
intensional/extensional ambiguity. Most perceptual verbs have uses that
seem to have little to do with perception, experience, or the senses. For
example, when one says that Bob sees threats everywhere, that one has
heard the news, or that something doesn’t feel right, it seems that one is
not talking about episodes of perception, phenomenal consciousness, or any
kind of sensory activity: Bob need not have any relevant sensory activity,
the news might have been read in a newspaper (so not literally heard), and
things not feeling right seems to have more to do with intuition than the
senses. Such non-perceptual uses of perceptual verbs are outside the scope of
Thesis I. My claim is only that perceptual uses that are also intensional are
pure phenomenal ascriptions.8 For ease of exposition, I stipulate that non-
perceptual uses of perceptual verbs do not count as perceptual ascriptions
(intensional or extensional).
The easiest way to see that IPAs are pure phenomenal ascriptions is to
7“Experiencing” ascriptions can be read intensionally or extensionally just like percep-
tual ascriptions, but I take it that they are normally given intensional readings, and I will
assume such readings unless otherwise noted.
8Brogaard (2012) draws a similar distinction, but she distinguishes a third sense of
“see.”
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consider them in context. For example, imagine that you have just under-
gone surgery to receive a cerebral implant that is supposed to augment your
visualization abilities. Your neurologist will now perform some tests on you
to verify that the implant functions properly. She begins by putting a device
on your head. After returning to her console, she says, “now tell me whether
you see a blue grid about one meter in front of you.” It is natural to take
the neurologist to be asking whether you are experiencing a blue grid (as
a philosopher would put it), perhaps among other properties. The context
forces an intensional reading of the verb “to see,” and this seems to result in
an understanding of the IPA in italics as ascribing a phenomenal property.
If the neurologist’s IPA ascribes a phenomenal property, there are two
possibilities: either it ascribes a phenomenal property and nothing else (it is
a pure phenomenal ascription), or it ascribes a complex state that involves a
phenomenal property among other properties. What could the other prop-
erties be in the second case? Clearly, the neurologist did not want to know
whether you thought (or believed or judged) that there really was a blue grid
in front of you (she knew that you would not believe this whether or not
you sawi a blue grid). She did not want to know about the external cause
or normal cause of the state you were in either. She knew about its external
cause already, and insisting that the state you were in is normally caused
by blue grids would not satisfy her. She might well say, “For all I know you
are one of those inverts—I want to know how it was like subjectively for
you.” She was also not asking about your physiological condition. Indirectly,
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perhaps, she was (if physicalism is true), but her meaning was not “Are you
in such and such brain state?” because she knew that you could not answer
such a question. So seeing a blue grid in the neurologist’s sense does not a
priori entail that some condition pertaining to judgments, the causes of the
experience, or one’s physiology obtains. It also does not seem to be a matter
of having an experience of a certain kind while a disjunction or other logical
combination of these conditions obtains. In other words, there seems to be
nothing else for the neurologist to be asking about but phenomenology. Con-
sequently, it seems that by “see a blue grid,” your neurologist meant exactly
what philosophers mean by “visually experience a blue grid.”
These remarks apply mutatis mutandis to anything that one can be said
to see (in the perceptual sense). The neurologist could have asked about a
triangle, a pink elephant, or anything else that you might be able to experi-
ence visually. In every case, it would be natural to understand her as making
an intensional perceptual ascription because of the context. It would also
be natural to understand her as asking about a (pure) phenomenal property,
because there is nothing else for her to be asking about.
Parallel observations apply to other modalities. Suppose for example
that you are hearing a ringing in your left ear. Typically, part of what you
mean when you say that you are hearing a ringing is that you are having
an experience of a certain kind, namely, an auditory experience of a ringing.
What else might you intend to say? Normally, to say that you are hearing
a ringing is not to say anything about your beliefs, your environment, your
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physical state, or the current or normal circumstances of your state, because
you could conceivably hear a ringing whatever your beliefs or the state of your
body or environment. As in the case of seeing blue grids, there seems to be
nothing for the expression “hearing a ringing” to pick out but a phenomenal
property. Similarly, if I say that I am feeling pain in my phantom arm, all I
am talking about is a phenomenal property.
That IPAs are pure phenomenal ascriptions can also be brought out by
reflecting on the grounds of certain ascriptions. Suppose that you get up
too quickly and “see stars” as a result. You say, “I’m seeing stars.” That
you are seeing stars is something that you would normally realize sponta-
neously. So it is plausible that you would normally come to notice that you
are seeing stars either perceptually or introspectively, not through some kind
of explicit reasoning (which is not to say that you are not reasoning at some
subconscious level). But you do not normally make any relevant perceptual
judgments when you find yourself seeing stars: as a general rule, you know
full well that there are no specks of light in front of you. So it seems that
the basis of your assertion, in the normal case at least, must be an intro-
spective judgment. It is plausible that there are only three kinds of mental
states we can introspect: propositional attitudes, occurrent thoughts (judg-
ments), and, least controversially, experiences. Since seeingi stars does not
seem to involve having a propositional attitude or making a judgment about
stars, it must be experiences that you introspect. So it seems that seeing
stars consists in nothing more than a phenomenal property. The same line
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of argument straightforwardly applies to other IPAs.
In addition to illustrating the fact that IPAs are pure phenomenal as-
criptions, the preceding example illustrates another important observation
about IPAs: we often use natural or artificial kind terms as part of IPAs
without meaning to refer to the kinds normally designated by these terms.
It is clear that when one says that one seesi stars, one does not mean that
one is seeingi celestial bodies. The word “stars” here stands for things that
are superficially like stars, not for celestial bodies. Such superficial uses of
kind terms are common as part of IPAs. This can obscure the fact that IPAs
ascribe phenomenal properties. For example, if I say that I saw a car, an
elephant, or an alien while hallucinating, it might seem natural to take me
to be self-ascribing something else than a phenomenal property, because I
arguably cannot phenomenally experience a car, an elephant, or an alien.9
This inference should be rejected, because someone who claims to have seen
a car, an elephant, or an alien in a hallucinatory context normally intends
the relevant kind term to be understood superficially, not literally.
3 Are perceptual verbs ambiguous?
Assuming a view of propositions as compositionally formed structures of
properties, relations, quantifiers, individuals, or intensions for such entities,
we can talk about the contribution that a perceptual verb makes to a propo-
9But see Siegel (2010 and 2006) and Brogaard (2013) for discussion.
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sition stated in a context. We would expect such a contribution to be either
a property, a relation, or an intension for a property or relation. My claim in
this section is that the contribution of a perceptual verb is the same between
the intensional and extensional readings of a perceptual ascription.
Thesis II: Perceptual verbs make the same contributions to intensional and
extensional readings.
One observation that supports thesis II is that the key differences between
intensional and extensional readings can be explained in terms of quantifier
scope. Intuitively, the extensional reading of (6) can be paraphrased as (14),
in which the quantifier explicitly takes wide scope over the verb.
(14) There is a pink elephant that I see.
This is not the case with intensional readings. As a result, it seems that
quantifiers take wide scope over the verb on extensional readings but not on
intensional readings. In Bourget 2017a, I argue that this quantifier scope
difference can explain all the key differences between intensional and exten-
sional readings. If this is right, it seems plausible that the difference between
these readings lies exclusively at the level of quantifier scope, and so that
perceptual verbs make the same contributions to intensional and extensional
readings.
Well-known ambiguity tests provide more evidence for thesis II. Consider
the conjunction reduction test (Chomsky 1957, p. 358; Zwicky and Sadock
1975, p. 18). Suppose that you are experimenting with a drug that has the
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effect of making you see colorful animals without otherwise altering your
perception of your environment. You could describe a particular experience
using (15 a). So long as we don’t take this use of “and” to imply a temporal
ordering, it seems that we can reduce the two clauses of (15 a) to just one
(15 b).
(15) (a) I saw the bed and I saw a pink elephant.
(b) I saw the bed and a pink elephant.
The first clause of (15 a) is most naturally read extensionally, whereas its
second clause is most naturally read intensionally. There is a natural reading
of (15 b) on which it seems equivalent to the most natural (mixed) reading of
(15 a). This would not be possible if “saw” didn’t make the same contribution
to intensional and extensional readings.
Ascriptions involving other perceptual verbs than “see” also pass the con-
junction reduction test. For example, someone who has a tendency to hear
voices but is not otherwise subject to hallucinations might describe their
situation using either (16 a) or (16 b).
(16) (a) I hear cars outside, and I hear voices.
(b) I hear cars outside, and voices.
The same goes with “feel”:
(17) (a) I feel my (phantom) leg and I feel the seat.
(b) I feel my (phantom) leg and the seat.
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One can also make statements that combine intensional and extensional read-
ings without being equivalent to conjunctions of IPAs and purely extensional
ascriptions:
(18) I saw a small pink elephant dancing on the table.
(18) is naturally taken to state that there is a unique salient table which is
such that I experienced a small pink elephant dancing on it. This reading is
intensional with respect one quantifier (“a small pink elephant”) but not the
other (“the table”). This reading would be unavailable if the verb “to see”
contributed different properties or relations on intensional and extensional
readings.
Reflection on the truth conditions of certain EPAs provides more evidence
for thesis II. Consider (19) as a statement about a hallucination:
(19) I see the color you like.
On its most natural understanding, (19) is extensional because it entails that
there is a color that you like. At the same time, however, its truth seems to
require that a true statement satisfies schema (20), which involves an IPA.
(20) C is the color you like, and I seei something C.
If we can specify the truth conditions of (19) in this way, “see” must make the
same contribution to intensional and extensional readings. Parallel remarks
apply to (21) and (22).
(21) I heard the same thing as you (but we were both hallucinating).
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(22) I feel what you feel (but the feeling is hallucinatory).
On the most natural readings of (21) and (22), the truth of these state-
ments requires that the definite descriptions occurring in them denote. So,
these statements are extensional. Since both statements, like (19), seem to
state propositions that are made true by facts stated by intensional percep-
tual ascriptions, it seems that “hear” and “feel” must make the same contri-
butions to intensional and extensional readings.
Relatedly, IPAs and EPAs can be combined in formally valid inferences.
Imagine that the following claims are comments about what is going on as
we are both hallucinating:
(23) You see a light flashing. [intensional]
I see everything you see. [extensional]
Therefore, I see a light flashing. [intensional]
(24) You see a rabbit. [intensional]
I don’t see anything you see. [extensional]
Therefore, I don’t see a rabbit. [intensional]
(25) I heard the same thing as you. [extensional]
You heard noise coming from the left. [intensional]
Therefore, I heard noise coming from the left. [intensional]
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These inferences seem to be formally valid in the following sense: one can
see that they are valid without having much of a grasp of what the state-
ments that compose them state, so long as one has an understanding of the
structures of the propositions stated. For example, one need not be able to
articulate anything at all about what is involved in seeing or hearing some-
thing, or to know what a noise, flashing light, or rabbit is. If these inferences
are formally valid in this sense, perceptual verbs must make the same con-
tributions to intensional and extensional readings.
Another observation that supports thesis II is that perceptual ascriptions
that are devoid of scope ambiguity or a possible ambiguity in the meaning
of the object of the verb are not subject to multiple readings. For example,
(26) has no coherent reading.
(26) # This, I see but I don’t see.
If “see” could be taken to contribute different relations or properties, we
would expect (26) to be coherent on some reading.
Together, the preceding considerations amount to a fairly good case for
thesis II. They also lend support back to the scopal account of the inten-
sional/extensional distinction discussed in section 1: if perceptual verbs make
the same contributions to intensional and extensional readings, something
else has to vary between these readings. Clearly, it is not the meaning of
words such as “pink” and “flash,” so it seems that it has to be the logical
form of the statements.10
10Above I noted that the interpretation of kind words sometimes varies between IPAs
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4 The relational structure of IPAs
My last thesis regarding IPAs is that they have a relational form. More
specifically:
Thesis III: For every perceptual verb φ, there is a relation R such that
every proposition stated by an IPA of the form “α φ-s S” has, at some
level of abstraction, the form R(α,__).11
One argument for thesis III is that it is an immediate consequence of the
scopal account of the intensional/extensional distinction given in section 1,
which, as I just noted, is further supported by thesis II. But other arguments
can be made independently of the scopal account.
Note first that the claim that extensional perceptual ascriptions have a
relational structure hardly needs defending. It is part of the definition of
extensional ascriptions that they entail existential claims about the object of
the verb: if one seese an F, it follows by the definition of extensional readings
that there is an F. Since entailing existential claims about an apparent argu-
ment is a strong indicator that there really is an argument, it seems highly
probable that extensional ascriptions have a relational structure. Relatedly,
perceptual verbs must contribute relations to EPAs in order to accommodate
the fact that existential quantifiers take wide scope over perceptual verbs on
such readings.
and EPAs, but it does not always vary.
11This thesis could also be stated in a way that allows that perceptual verbs contribute
intensions rather than relations, but I assume a broadly Russellian view of propositions
for simplicity.
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Given that EPAs are relational, thesis II enables a straightforward argu-
ment for thesis III: if perceptual verbs contribute certain relations to exten-
sional readings and perceptual verbs make the same contributions to inten-
sional and extensional readings (thesis II), it follows that perceptual verbs
contribute these same relations to intensional readings. Unlike the first ar-
gument I mentioned above, this one does not rely on the scopal account of
the intensional/extensional distinction.
Another consideration in favor of thesis III is that IPAs pass a general test
indicating that the verb contributes a dyadic property: they can participate
in formally valid inferences that would not be formally valid were the property
expressed monadic.12 Consider arguments (23)-(25) in the preceding section.
Explaining the formal validity of these arguments seems to require that we
analyze the premises and conclusions relationally. For example, argument
(23) becomes (27), where the variable ε ranges over individuals, properties,
higher-order properties, and all other potentially relevant entities.
(27) See(Y ou,ALightF lashing)
∀(See(Y ou, )→ See(I, ))
∴ See(I, ALightF lashing)
Whatever ALightFlashing is, it must be one of the things that  ranges over,
and “You seei a light flashing” has to be analyzed as ascribing a relation
to this thing even though it is intensional. Otherwise it is not possible to
12c.f. Davidson 1967, Schiffer 1990, Pietroski 2009, and Grzankowski 2016.
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explain the formal validity of the inference.
We can also argue directly that IPAs support existential claims. For
example, if I am perceivingi a large object, there is something that I am
perceiving: it would not be accurate to say that I am not perceiving anything
at all. What I am perceiving might not be a large object or any kind of
object, but it is something, in the broadest possible sense of “something.”
This argument is reminiscent of arguments for sense-data, but the objects of
intensional ascriptions need not be mental particulars, as we will see below.
On the contrary, we will see that the theses defended so far support the main
views that are opposed to sense-data.
5 Relationalism
We have seen that I) IPAs are pure phenomenal ascriptions, II) perceptual
verbs make the same contributions to IPAs and EPAs, and III) IPAs have a
relational form. In this and the remaining sections, I explore the implications
of these theses for views of perception and perceptual experience, starting
with the implications of I-III for relationalism.
According to relationalism (also known as naïve realism), veridical per-
ceptual experiences relate us to the concrete objects we perceive: for one
to see, hear, smell, or otherwise perceive a concrete object x is for one to
undergo a perceptual experience that is a relationship to x (perhaps among
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other things).13,14
Relationalism is supported by theses I-III as follows. Thesis I tells us that
a statement of the form “I see S,” on its intensional reading, states the same
proposition that is expressed by a statement of the form “I visually experience
S ” as typically used by philosophers. Assuming that identical propositions
have identical parts arranged in the same way, this implies that “see” in
IPAs contributes the same property or relation as “visually experience” on
philosophers’ reading. That is, seeingi is visually experiencing.
P1 seeingi = visually experiencing
According to thesis II, “see” makes the same contribution to intensional and
extensional readings.
P2 seeinge = seeingi
According to thesis III, “see” contributes a relation to IPAs.
P3 seeingi is a relation
From P1-P3, we can conclude that seeinge a concrete object x is a matter
of visually experiencing x, where visually experiencing is a relation. This is
13Proponents of this view include Snowdon (1980), Child (1992), Langsam (1997),
Campbell (2002), Martin (2004, 2006), Hellie (2007, 2010), Sturgeon (2008), Fish (2009),
Brewer (2007), Schellenberg (2010, 2011, 2014, 2016), Logue (2011, 2012), and Genone
(2014, forthcoming). The disjunctivism of Hinton (1967) is an important precursor.
14Another claim that is sometimes labeled “naïve realism” is that we directly perceive
external objects. What is meant by “directly” is in need of spelling out. I take it that the
preferred spelling out yields an understanding of naïve realism that is equivalent to the
above view: in veridical perception at least, we directly perceive external objects in that
our experiences are relationships to them.
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just relationalism for visual perception. Since this reasoning applies mutatis
mutandis to other modalities, theses I-III seem to establish relationalism
generally.
A claim that has often been made in support of relationalism is that it
captures our naïve, pre-theoretic conception of perceptual experience. Our
findings vindicate this claim: not only is relationalism the naïve view, but it
is analytic, true in virtue of the very meanings of the relevant terms.
While I hold that relationalism is true (and analytic), I want to stress that
nothing I said so far supports certain additional claims that are often asso-
ciated with relationalism. One closely associated view is particularism, the
view that we experience external objects. To be more precise, I understand
particularism to be the claim that certain possible statements of the form
“α experiences β” are true, where the verb “to experience” is given its usual
technical meaning and β is a name. If relationalism is true, perceiving an
object is a matter of experiencing it. So relationalism implies particularism
on the assumption that we perceive external objects. However, relationalism
does not entail particularism on its own because it does not entail that we
perceive external objects. Theses I-III also do not entail that we perceive
external objects. We arrived at theses I-III by reflecting on the ordinary uses
of perceptual ascriptions. No amount of reflection on linguistic usage is going
to show that there are objects out there that we experience. Put differently,
theses I-III shed light on what everyday perceptual statements mean, but
they do not to tell us whether such statements are ever true. I briefly discuss
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the second question in section 8, but it falls outside the scope of my core
project in this paper.
Relationalism is also closely associated with the denial of the causal theory
of perception. Here we need to bear in mind that there are two importantly
different versions of this theory. One view, which I am going to refer to as
CTP, states that in every case in which one perceives an external object x,
one does so at least in part in virtue of being in an internal state that bears a
broadly causal relation to x. As stated, this is a universally quantified thesis
about instances of perception in the actual world, and it may or may not
be a priori true. A stronger view, ACTP, claims that CTP is a priori or
conceptually necessary.
ACTP clearly bears a logical connection to relationalism. This connec-
tion is made by Snowdon (1980) as part of his attack on ACTP.15 Simplifying
considerably, Snowdon’s main argument against ACTP is that relationalism
is conceivable, and experiencing an object x does not a priori entail stand-
ing in a causal relation to x, so it is not a priori or conceptually necessary
that perceiving involves a causal relation (ACTP is false). Our case for rela-
tionalism lends additional support to Snowdon’s argument by showing that
relationalism is not only conceivable but analytic. However, our case for rela-
tionalism leaves CTP untouched. Even if perception is a matter of experience
and it is conceivable that experience does not require causation, it is also con-
15ACTP is the view defended by Strawson (1974) and Grice (1989).
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ceivable that causation plays a role in constituting experience.16 In fact, it
seems that we normally assume that causation plays a role in constituting
perceptual experience. When, in one scenario made famous by Grice (1961)
and P. F. Strawson (1974), we judge that the object seen (i.e. experienced)
is the one whose image is reflected in the mirror, and not the identical ob-
ject located where the perceived object appears to be, we do so on the basis
of the assumption that a causal link is (at least in practice) necessary for
perception. This is a very natural assumption. For what else could link us
up to objects? It would be pure magic if we managed to latch on external
objects without any causal connection. So there is an intuitive case for CTP
as an a posteriori thesis even if ACTP is false. This is just to say that theses
I-III are compatible with causalist intuitions about perception, not that such
intuitions are correct.
6 Disjunctivism
One view associated with relationalism that is supported by our findings is
disjunctivism. This view comes in several forms. As I understand it, the
general idea is that hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory experiences differ in
16There is an old debate between Alex Rosenberg (1989) and Mohan Matthen (1989)
regarding the consistency of a causal theory of perception and the intensionality of percep-
tion (though neither recognizes as much intensionality as I do, because neither recognizes
IPAs). I don’t see why an a posteriori causal account of perceptual relations would be
inconsistent with the intensionality of perceptual ascriptions as explicated here (and in
Bourget ibid.), which is a purely logical feature, so I agree with Matthen. The congenial-
ity of theses I-III to a reductive theory of perception such as Matthen’s will become clearer
in sections 7 and 8.
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some important, fundamental way, such that non-hallucinatory perception
cannot be seen as the sum of a) the same kind of experiential element that
is found in hallucinatory experiences and b) an additional condition that
differentiates a hallucination from a non-hallucination.17 Non-hallucinatory
perception is just extensional perception: it is perceivinge something. Since
the sorts of experiences present in hallucinations are the sorts of experiences
characterized by IPAs, we can reformulate disjunctivism as the claim that
EPAs cannot be reduced to or analyzed as IPAs plus some additional con-
ditions. To be more precise, I take the core disjunctivist view to be that no
EPA Se is such that there is some IPA Si and an additional success condition
C such that Se can be analyzed as (is analytically equivalent to) Si∧C.18
To assess this claim, we must consider EPAs with two different forms:
quantified EPAs, in which some NPs within the object of the verb are quan-
tified noun phrases (QNPs; 28, 29), and singular EPAs, in which all NPs
within the object of the verb are names (30, 31).
(28) I seee a toddler walking.
(29) I seee a toddler.
(30) I seee Fred.
17This characterization of disjunctivism puts illusion on the same side as veridical per-
ception, which is an issue on which theorists differ (see Byrne & Logue 2008 for discussion).
18This understanding of the disjunctivist thesis is close to Martin’s: “we should not
think that perceptual experience is to be analyzed as a common factor of perception and
either illusion or hallucination.” (2004) It also seems to be a core implication of Hinton’s
(1967) and Snowdon’s (1980 and 1990) disjunctivist views.
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(31) I seee Fred walking.
The scopal account of the intensional/extensional distinction sketched in sec-
tion 1 and further justified by thesis II makes transparent the correctness of
the disjunctivist thesis as far as quantified EPAs are concerned. These EPAs
quantify into the object of the verb, while IPAs do not. Unless C itself is
a variant on Se, conjoining it to a statement S i that does not quantify-in
cannot result in a statement that is equivalent to Se, which quantifies-in.
It is not possible to go from P (α, [__]) to ∃xP (α,[__x__]) by conjoining
a statement of the first form to some other statement that does not itself
contain a statement of the second form.
The case of singular EPAs is a littler trickier, but it can be considerably
simplified if we assume that names contribute individuals to singular EPAs.
For example, the structure of (30) might be represented as (32).
(32) See(I, Fred)
Given this Millian view of names, singular perceptual ascriptions do not have
intensional readings. If “Fred” fails to refer, (30) does not express a complete
proposition. To make sense of an ascription such as (30) in absence of Fred,
we would have to take it to relate the subject to some kind of Fred-surrogate,
but there is no reasonable candidate to play the role of surrogate. For this
reason, there are no singular intensional ascriptions. Given that there are no
singular intensional ascriptions, an analysis of an extensional ascription such
as (30) in terms of an intensional ascription plus additional conditions would
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have to start with a qualitative intensional ascription of the form “I see an
F” or “I see the F,” to which some claim to the effect that Fred is the one F
would be conjoined.
This attempt to analyze singular terms away does not work. The funda-
mental problem is that the meaning of (32) does not single out any particular
set of properties that one must experience in order to see Fred. Statement
(32) obviously does not entail that one experiences the essence of Fred. Even
more obviously, it does not entail that one experiences any particular set of
the superficial features of Fred. Since perception is experience (by theses
I-II), it follows that any choice of F would result in a purported analysans
that says more than the analysandum. It is unclear what are the truth con-
ditions of (32), but we need not go deeper into this topic for now (I briefly
return to it in section 8). Whatever the truth conditions of (32) might be,
they cannot be analyzed as conjunctions of intensional perceivings of certain
properties together with additional claims attributing the properties to in-
dividuals. Disjunctivists’ intuitions about the irreducibility of “good cases”
have their source in the very semantics of perceptual ascriptions.
The preceding argument for disjunctivism regarding singular EPAs takes
its starting point from Millianism about names, but there is reason to think
that other views lead to the same conclusion. A variant on the Millian view
common among semanticists is that names contribute generalized quantifiers
involving individuals, or intensions for such quantifiers (see Montague 1973,
Barwise and Cooper 1981, and Westerståhl 2011). Since these quantifiers are
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not definable when the name does not refer, this view has the same conse-
quences as the Millian view. Another possible view (not very popular today,
but plausibly applicable to certain special cases at least) is that names are
definite descriptions in disguise. On this view, names should be subject to
the same scope ambiguity as overt QNPs, so the above account should apply.
If names contribute Fregean senses, it is a bit less clear how the discussion
should be adapted. It depends on what sort of logical roles these senses can
play. But if they work like quantifiers, which standard semantic considera-
tions suggest (ibid.), then our considerations regarding QNPs should extend
to names. Overall, the case of names is tricky because names are tricky,
but we can see how disjunctivism might turn out to be made true by the
semantics of EPAs and IPAs, depending on how questions about names are
resolved. In any case, disjunctivism is at least clearly analytic with respect
to quantified ascriptions, which is an interesting finding.
While the preceding considerations support a kind of disjunctivism, the
view of perceptual ascriptions developed here contradicts other views that
go by this name. In particular, the above account contradicts the view that
there is “no common factor” between veridical perceptual experiences and hal-
lucinations, because it entails that the same perceptual relation is involved
in veridical and hallucinatory cases. This brings out a distinction between
disjunctivism about the objects of perception and disjunctivism about percep-
tion. The first view is that hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory perceptual
episodes do not have the same objects (relata). This view is supported by the
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above account. The second view is that hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory
perceptual episodes have nothing in common, or nothing non-trivial or inter-
esting in common. This view is refuted by I-III.19
7 Representationalism
Perhaps surprisingly, theses I-III support representationalism in addition to
relationalism and disjunctivism.
Representationalists claim that phenomenal consciousness is a kind of
representation or intentionality.20 Before we can assess this claim, we need
to be clear on what representation or intentionality is supposed to be. It is
not enough to say that intentionality is “aboutness” or “directedness.” These
metaphors simply do not give us enough purchase on the notion for us to be
able to tell for sure whether this or that case is one of intentionality (many
things have directedness, not all have intentionality, and it is unclear how to
draw the line). For present purposes, I understand representationalists’ claim
as being that phenomenal properties are similar in nature to propositional at-
titudes, and I assume that the important feature of propositional attitudes is
19Strictly speaking, any two things always have something in common. This is why
qualifications such as “non-trivial” or “interesting” are necessary. But these qualifications
are quite vague, making it hard to see what the substance of the thesis might be. The
above precisification of disjunctivism in terms of analyzability seems to me to capture core
intuitions with satisfying clarity.
20Note that this is not the sort of “representationalism” associated with David Marr
and the sense-datum theory of perception: the view is not that perception is mediated by
internal representations. On the contrary, my kind of representationalism is motivated in
good part by a desire to account for the direct nature of perception. See Harman 1990
and Seager and Bourget 2007.
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that they are nonfactive relations to propositions, on some broad understand-
ing of “propositions” that includes a range of things (sets of possible worlds,
structured propositions, ways the world can be, functions from worlds to
truth values, etc.).21 Given these assumptions, it is natural to precisify the
central representationalist tenet with respect to perceptual experience as fol-
lows: for every sensory modality m, there is some nonfactive relation R such
that, for every basic phenomenal property p in m there is some proposition P
such that p = standing in R to P, on some broad understanding of “proposi-
tion.”22 Put loosely, experiences are nonfactive relationships to propositions.
Here I am going to focus on representationalism about perceptual experience,
the claim that every basic perceptual phenomenal property is a nonfactive
relationship to a proposition.
By basic phenomenal property, I mean a phenomenal property that does
not consist merely in having some properties among a set of distinct phe-
nomenal properties. For example, experiencing red or experiencing blue is
not a basic phenomenal property because it consists merely in having one of
the properties in this set: {experiencing red, experiencing blue}. Since they
21To a first approximation, a nonfactive relation is a propositional relation that is insen-
sitive to the truth of propositions. For example, the belief relation is nonfactive, whereas
the knowledge relation is factive.
22This type of representationalism (modulo the limitation to basic phenomenal proper-
ties) is endorsed by Pautz (2009, 2010b and 2010a), Speaks (2009, 2010, 2015b,a), and Sosa
(2010). Other proponents of representationalism include: Byrne (2001), Byrne and Tye
(2006), Chalmers (2004, 2006), Crane (2003), Dretske (1995), Harman (1990), Hill (2009),
Jackson (2004), Lycan (1987, 1996, 2001), Mendelovici (2013, 2014), Nanay (2012), Schel-
lenberg (2010, 2011, 2014), Tye (1995a,b, 2000, 2002, 2003a,b, 2007, 2008, 2015), and
myself (2010, 2015, 2017c and 2017b; Bourget and Mendelovici 2014).
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are straightforwardly explained by basic phenomenal properties, non-basic
phenomenal properties need not be part of a theory such as representation-
alism. Whether or not representationalism as I define it truly deserves the
name of “representationalism,” establishing that this view is correct would
be a big step toward representationalism.
In order to establish representationalism about perceptual experience as
I understand it, we need to show i) that the basic perceptual phenomenal
properties consist in standing in relations to propositions and ii) that the
relevant relations are nonfactive. As we have seen already, theses I-III imply
that the perceptual relations (seeing, etc.) are experiential relations (visually
experiencing, etc.). Conversely, visually experiencing is seeing, aurally expe-
riencing is hearing, and so on. Assuming that every perceptual phenomenal
property is a kind of perceptual experiencing, we know that every basic per-
ceptual phenomenal property consists in standing in a certain experiential
relation to something. In order to establish (i), we only need to show that
the relevant relata are propositions.
Given the identity of perception and perceptual experience, we can es-
tablish this by showing that every perceptual ascription that ascribes a basic
phenomenal property ascribes a relation to a proposition.23 As a first step
23One might ask why I don’t consider the semantics of “experiencing” directly. The
reason for this is that my use of “experiencing” is a technical one, and one might doubt that
a semantic analysis of a technical notion can tell us much about the pre-theoretic concept
of experience. Also, I have become convinced that a significant number of philosophers
writing on perception consistently use the term “experiencing” with its ordinary meaning,
not its technical meaning.
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toward this conclusion, notice that perceptual ascriptions with NP objects
do not seem to ascribe basic phenomenal properties. Phenomenologically,
it seems that one cannot merely seei a triangle: one has to see the triangle
doing something or other (if only being a triangle). This also seems true of
extensional ascriptions: one does not merely seee a triangle. We don’t merely
see properties or objects that happen to bear properties, we see instantia-
tions of properties. Generalizing from these cases, it seems that “I see NP”
means something along the line of there is a possible state of affairs involving
[NP] that I see, where the NP, if it is a quantified NP, can be given either
wide scope or narrow scope over the description of the state of affairs. For
example, seeingi a triangle seems to be a matter of there being a proposition
or possible state of affairs that I see and that involves the quantifier denoted
by “a triangle,” or some such entity. Seeinge a triangle seems to be a matter
of there being a proposition or possible state of affairs that I see and that
involves an object that is a triangle (whether or not its being triangular is
part of what I see). Parallel remarks apply to singular NP ascriptions such
(30). One cannot merely perceive an individual: one has to perceive the in-
dividual being some way or other. So it seems that NP ascriptions in general
are not ascriptions of basic phenomenal properties.
If NP ascriptions are not ascriptions of basic phenomenal properties, only
perceptual ascriptions complemented by clauses might be ascriptions of ba-
sic phenomenal properties. Clausal perceptual ascriptions can have one of
five kinds of clauses as complement: bare infinitive clauses (10), particip-
35
ial (-ing) clauses (11), nominal relative clauses (33), “wh”-clauses (which are
superficially similar to nominal relative clauses; 34), and “that”-clauses (35).
(33) (a) I see what you described.
(b) I see what you feel.
(34) (a) I see where it is.
(b) I see why you did this.
(35) (a) I see that he has arrived.
(b) I hear that it is over.
(c) I feel that this is wrong.
Nominal relative clauses compress descriptions involving a noun and a
relative clause that qualities the noun. For example, (33 a) can be spelled out
as “I see the things that you described.” They are effectively noun phrases
in disguise, so, like NP ascriptions, they do not ascribe basic phenomenal
properties.
“That”-clause complemented perceptual statements seem to fall in the
category of non-perceptual uses of perceptual verbs. More specifically, they
seem to be metaphorical uses of perceptual verbs. This is suggested by the
heterogeneity of these ascriptions. Consider first that “that”-clause comple-
mented “seeing,” “hearing,” and “feeling” ascriptions make sense, as illustrated
above, but “I smell that ___” and “I taste that ___” don’t seem to make
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sense. Also, “seeing that” is factive, whereas “hearing that” and “feeling that”
are not. “Seeing that” seems to be a metaphor used to convey that one is,
cognitively, directly accessing certain facts in a manner similar to how one
sees a fact. “Hearing that” is a metaphor used to convey the receipt of certain
information through some kind of communication. This does not necessarily
involve any auditory perception: one can hear that something is the case by
reading it on Facebook. “Feeling that” conveys that one has a cognitive or
emotional attitude towards something and one’s having this attitude involves
a certain felt quality. Here the choice of the verb “to feel” is meant to indicate
that there is some phenomenology involved, but it is not used in the same
way as when one says that one feels a texture with one’s hand. None of
these metaphorical or otherwise anomalous uses ascribes a basic phenomenal
property, so they are not relevant to (i).
Grammar textbooks tell us that “wh”-clauses, unlike the superficially sim-
ilar nominal relative clauses, always relate to stated or tacit questions. For
example, (34 a) claims that I in some sense have the answer to the question
“where is it?” If we were to further spell out what is reported, we would
say that I see that where it is is L, where L is some explicit description of
the location in question. In general, it seems that a “wh”-clause perceptual
ascription is a partial statement of a more complex “that”-clause perceptual
ascription that states that one is aware of a certain fact. Since only “seeing
that” ascriptions state such facts, this would explain why it is hard to come
up with “wh”-clause perceptual ascriptions involving other perceptual verbs
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than “to see.” This means also that “wh”-clause perceptual ascriptions are
not perceptual.
This leaves us with only two kinds of clausally complemented perceptual
ascriptions to consider in assessing (i): bare infinitive and participial ascrip-
tions. To simplify the exposition, I am going to refer to ascriptions of either
kind as genuine clausal ascriptions. If what we said so far is correct, all ba-
sic perceptual phenomenal properties can be ascribed using genuine clausal
ascriptions.
At this stage we have to consider that genuine clausal ascriptions have
both intensional and extensional readings. On its extensional reading, the
truth conditions of a statement such as (28) can be thought of as given by
an enormous disjunction along the following lines, where there is a disjunct
for each possible toddler that one might see walking:
(36) Toddler(α) ∧ See(I, [Walking(α)]) OR
Toddler(β) ∧ See(I, [Walking(β)]) ...
In other words, the truth of (28) requires that one of a certain set of dis-
tinct phenomenal properties obtains, and also that this phenomenal property
meets the further condition that the individual who is part of the content
experienced be a toddler. This means that the states ascribed by extensional
readings of quantified clausal ascriptions are not basic phenomenal proper-
ties. The properties that might be basic are those found in the disjuncts of
(36), which can be ascribed using singular, genuine clausal ascriptions such
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as “I see Fred walking,” and the properties ascribed on intensional readings
of other genuine clausal ascriptions. In other words, only genuine clausal
ascriptions that involve no quantifying-in might ascribe basic phenomenal
properties.
Now, it is quite plausible that genuine clausal ascriptions involving no
quantifying-in have the form R(α, P ), where R is a perceptual/experiencing
relation and P is a proposition. We know that such statements have a re-
lational form, so the question is only whether the second relatum, which is
clearly what is denoted by the complement of the verb, is a proposition or
an entity of some other kind. Candidate types of entities include individuals,
properties of individuals, intensions picking out individuals or properties of
individuals, facts, and various proposition-like entities (all of which I count
as propositions). One relevant consideration is that the complement of the
verb in a statement such as (28) seems to predicate a property of something.
This suggests that the complement is a fact or proposition. This is part of
why every semantic theory ascribes facts or propositions (broadly construed)
as semantic values of such complements. Relatedly, the other options are
phenomenologically inaccurate. As noted earlier, in basic phenomenal states
we see things being certain ways, not just individuals or ways for individ-
uals to be (properties of individuals). So, the relata of basic phenomenal
properties are plausibly either facts or propositions.
We know that statements such as (28) can be true despite the prop-
erty apparently ascribed to something not being had by anything (for ex-
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ample, without anyone being a toddler). This is true of intensional and
singular perceptual ascriptions in every modality. This at once establishes
that perceptual ascriptions that are genuine clausal ascriptions and that do
not quantify-in ascribe relations to propositions as opposed to facts, and that
these relations are nonfactive, which completes the argument for representa-
tionalism via (i) and (ii).
The representationalist view that the preceding discussion motivates faces
a large number of well-known objections. Among other objections, it might
seem phenomenologically inaccurate, it might seem to commit us to an im-
plausible ontology of abstracta, and it might seem to face numerous coun-
terexamples involving blur, perspective, pain, etc. There is a large literature
raising and addressing objections to representationalism. There is no space
here to contribute significantly to this literature, but I will say something
brief about the first objection, the objection that it is introspectively mani-
fest that we experience concrete objects rather than abstracta.24 I focus on
this objection because it has not been addressed as far as I know, it seems
particularly relevant given the phenomenological points I make as part of my
defense of representationalism, and some of the points I make above help
address it.
As noted above, an expression of the form “α φ-s NP,” where φ is a
perceptual verb, or the verb “to experience,” does not mean that one stands
in the relation expressed by the verb to whatever the NP denotes: rather, it
24Kriegel (2007) and Crane (2009) make something like this objection.
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means that one stands in a relation (perhaps not that expressed by the verb,
but a closely associated relation) to a proposition involving whatever the NP
denotes. So, to say that one experiences a proposition is to say that one
stands in an experiencing relation to a proposition involving a proposition.
Clearly, this is not normally the case when one has a perceptual experience.
This is arguably almost never the case. So, the objection under consideration
is correct as far as this goes: we do not experience propositions. However,
the objection is by the same token off target, because representationalism
does not say that basic experiences involve standing in experiencing relations
to propositions involving propositions. Representationalism merely says that
basic experiences involve standing in relations to propositions; it is consistent
with representationalism that these propositions are never propositions about
propositions.
Not only can the representationalist agree that we don’t experience propo-
sitions, but she can agree that we experience concrete objects. On our anal-
ysis of NP ascriptions, experiencing concrete objects is a matter of standing
in an experiencing relation to a proposition involving concrete objects. This
is clearly allowed by representationalism: the propositions that are the ob-
jects of our experiences can be concrete ways the world can be, which involve
concrete, spatiotemporal objects. If this is the case, we experience concrete
objects. Note that representationalism is consistent with this on two differ-
ent senses of “concrete objects.” In one sense, a concrete object is an actual
object. Representationalism allows that the objects of our experiences are
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singular propositions involving actual objects. In another sense, a concrete
object is a spatiotemporal object (the kind of thing one can bump against).
In this sense, representing that there is something having such and such spa-
tiotemporal properties should be sufficient for representing a concrete object,
even if one is not representing an actual object. Clearly, representationalism
allows that we represent spatiotemporal entities in this way as well.
While the preceding addresses the objection as stated, there is another
objection in the neighborhood that one can make and that is not fully ad-
dressed yet: one might claim that it is introspectively obvious that experience
is not a matter of being related to abstract entities such as propositions. This,
contrary to the claim that we don’t experience propositions but concrete ob-
jects, is a point about the nature of experience and its objects, not about the
nature of the items that figure within the objects of experiences.
A preliminary question to ask is what, exactly, is supposed to be said or
denied by introspection on this view. I take it that the typical objector here
does not think that introspection presents experience as non-relational. She
takes introspection to present experiences as relationships, but not as rela-
tionships to propositions. Presumably, introspection says something about
the relata. It seems that it must say that they are of one of the following
kinds: individuals, properties, propositions, or facts. The first two options
do not seem to be phenomenologically accurate for reasons that we have dis-
cussed already. This leaves us with two possible views regarding the deliv-
erances of introspections: either it tells us that experiences are relationships
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to facts, or it tells us that experiences are relationships to propositions.
At this point, the short answer to this objection is that it seems irrelevant
to representationalism whether introspection tends to present our experiences
as relationships to facts or propositions. If, as seems plausible, facts are sim-
ply true propositions, the question boils down to whether introspection, in
addition to presenting our experiences as relationships to propositions, tells
us that these propositions are true.25 Either way, what introspection says
would be consistent with the representationalist picture of the nature of ex-
perience. The only introspective pronouncements in this neighborhood that
would be in tension with representationalism would be pronouncements to
the effect that certain phenomenal states are essentially relationships to true
propositions. But if this were the case, the way things seem introspectively
would be inconsistent with things not being as presented in experience: it
would, barring any failure of rationality, be inconceivable that this, what
I introspect as the object of my experience, is not how the world really is
while I am experiencing it. It seems to me that such possibilities are always
readily conceivable, and so that what introspection tells us does not include
any pronouncements regarding the infallibility of experience.
25My assumption that facts are true propositions might seem controversial, but it should
not be given that I take a broad view of propositions. For example, possible states of affairs
are propositions.
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8 The bottom line
The main upshot of our discussion of the semantics of perceptual ascriptions
is that perception and perceptual experience are one and the same thing.
This conclusion follows from theses I and II. If we combine this conclusion
with a relational view of perception/experience (thesis III), we obtain rela-
tionalism. If we combine a broadly relational view of perception/experience
with a plausible account of the structure of certain perceptual ascriptions,
and other plausible claims regarding the relationship between perceptual as-
criptions and phenomenal properties, we get representationalism. Disjunc-
tivism can similarity be defended on the basis of theses I-III and plausible
auxiliary assumptions.
My conclusion that relationalism, disjunctivism, and representationalism
are all true might seems suspicious, because the latter view is commonly
thought to be opposed to the former views.26 One might think that either I
am not talking about the real relationalist, disjunctivist, and representation-
alist views, or my overall position is inconsistent. Relatedly, one might ask
what is the true picture of the metaphysics of experience if what I say above is
correct: since relationalism (together with disjunctivism) and representation-
alism are generally taken to offer incompatible pictures of the metaphysics
of experience, what should we make of the above conclusions?
26A notable exception is Schellenberg (2014), who argues that the representational and
relational views can be reconciled by adopting a gappy content view of hallucinatory
experience. This is an alternative approach to reconciling the two views.
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I readily admit that my uses of the terms “relationalism,” “disjunctivism,”
and “representationalism” might differ from those of many authors. This is
true simply in virtue of the fact that there are multiple views lumped under
each of these labels. What we have are families of views, and the views I
defend are somewhat regimented, streamlined theses in the ballpark of each
family of views. I do think, though, that they capture the spirit of each
family.
This can be made clearer by considering the role of an assumption shared
by nearly everyone in this debate. Virtually everyone assumes that mun-
dane extensional perceptual ascriptions such as “I see a table” are sometimes
true. As I noted earlier, this assumption goes beyond anything I have ar-
gued for here. Together with relationalism, this assumption commits us to
particularism, the view that we sometimes experience external particulars.
We can call this the argument from perception for particularism. The typ-
ical relationalist embraces the conclusion of this argument, but the typical
representationalist does not. Typical representationalists, impressed by the
observation that qualitatively indistinguishable objects do not seem to make
distinct contributions to the phenomenal character of experience, deny par-
ticularism. Because they think that we perceive external objects (EPAs are
sometimes true), they are committed to denying relationalism. This is not
because relationalism is inconsistent with representationalism; rather, this
is because the widespread assumption that EPAs are sometimes true and
the denial of particularism are both part of the broader representationalist
45
view. The real disagreement between the relationalist and the representa-
tionalist is at the level of particularism. This is why I can defend and endorse
relationalism and representationalism together.
For those interested in the deep nature of experience, the status of partic-
ularism is key. More precisely, the question whether it is possible for singular
(and extensional) perceptual ascriptions to be true is key. Suppose first that
this is possible. Then, arguably, the relationalist’s picture of the mind ex-
panding to encompass concrete reality is the correct metaphysical picture,
and the disjunctivist’s intuition that there are two fundamentally different
kinds of experience, the object-involving ones and the non-object-involving
ones, is correct. However, suppose that particularism is necessarily false.
Then all extensional perceptual ascriptions, whether singular or quantified,
are necessarily false. Relationalism and disjunctivism tell us certain facts
about what it would take for such ascriptions to be true, and they are cor-
rect as far as this goes. However, if these ascriptions are necessarily false,
they have more or less the status of confused statements: they ascribe to the
subject a relation to a particular (either a specific particular or one charac-
terized in generic terms) when the nature of the relation is such that it is
impossible to stand in it to a particular. On this view of things, EPAs are
analogous to a statement such as “I stepped on a musical note.” Musical
notes are just not the kinds of things that we can step on. For such a claim
to be true, we would have to be able to literally leap into the realm of forms,
where musical notes live. It is not part of our metaphysical picture of athletic
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capacities that they enable such jumps into the realm of forms because we
know that such claims are necessarily false (when taken literally). Similarly,
if particularism is necessarily false, the implications of EPAs are irrelevant
to the nature of experience. Only IPAs can be true, and the nature of the
states of affairs described by IPAs is the nature of experience. That is, expe-
rience is fundamentally a matter of standing in certain nonfactive relations
to propositions.
The broader relationalist and representationalist positions seem to me to
be both less than fully satisfactory. The broader representationalist position
is highly unsatisfactory because it involves the denial of an analytic truth,
relationalism. The broader relationalist position is unsatisfactory because
particularism is, it seems to me at least, implausible on its face. The prob-
lem, in a nutshell, is that I cannot introspectively identify a phenomenal way
things are that could make it true that I am experiencing, say, object 828,
and not merely something being such and such. I cannot introspectively find
the haeccities of external objects, and I don’t know what else could make
it true that I experience external objects, as opposed to merely experienc-
ing propositions such as there are such and such objects. I find this idea so
obscure that I am inclined to think it is not even possible to experience ex-
ternal objects. Some people have told me that it is introspectively manifest
to them that they experience external objects, but no one has been able to
help me find them in my own experience. There is a sense in which I intro-
spect a relationship to particular external objects, but this is fully accounted
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for by the view that the contents of experience are existentially quantified:
the variables that I experience stand for particular external objects, and I
experience them as such.
Since the broader relationalist and representationalist positions are both
less than fully satisfactory, it might be worth exploring the possibility of re-
jecting the common assumption that forces us to endorse one of these two
positions. Nearly everyone assumes that we perceive external objects, but it
is not clear what evidence we really have for this claim. The fact that we
commonly utter EPAs seems to be weak evidence: this might merely be a
convenient fiction that is encouraged by the grammar of perceptual verbs.
Even if we did not literally perceive (i.e. experience) external objects, we
would still be doing something quite similar to this that can explain every-
thing else that the perception of external objects is supposed to account for.
Arguably, everything that the perception of external objects is supposed to
explain can be explained simply by the fact that we gather information about
the external world through reliably caused experiences that have largely true
existentially quantified propositions as objects. Clearly, knowing that there
are such and such objects around me (fill in with a complex qualitative de-
scription) is sufficient to account for how I navigate my surroundings. Some
philosophers claim that particularism is required to account for singular ref-
erence, but this remains a minority view within a much broader debate on
reference sporting many competing views.27 It seems to me that there is
27See for example Snowdon 1980, Campbell 2002, and Schellenberg 2016.
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not, on reflection, a very strong case to maintain that we perceive external
objects. The case is at the very least more theoretical and debatable than
the direct phenomenological evidence against particularism. As a result, I
find myself inclined to endorse the neglected combination of views that ac-
cepts both relationalism and representationalism while denying particularism
and the perception of external objects. On this overall view, relationalism,
disjunctivism, and representationalism are all true and supported by the se-
mantics of perceptual ascriptions, but representationalism is the only view
that bears on the nature of experience.
References
Ali, S., Patel, M., Avenido, J., Jabeen, S., and Riley, W. J. (2011). Halluci-
nations: Common features and causes. Current Psychiatry, 10(11):22.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1965). The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammat-
ical Feature. In Butler, R. J., editor, Analytic Philosophy, pages 158–80.
Blackwell.
Austin, J. L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford University Press.
Ayer, A. J. (1940). The Foundations Of Empirical Knowledge. Macmillan.
Barwise, J. and Cooper, R. (1981). Generalized Quantifiers and Natural
Language. Linguistics and Philosophy, 4(2):159–219.
49
Blanke, O. and Landis, T. (2003). The metaphysical art of giorgio de chirico.
European neurology, 50(4):191–194.
Bourget, D. (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs,
44(1):32–58.
Bourget, D. (2015). Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits
of phenomenal concepts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45(1):16–36.
Bourget, D. (2017a). Intensional perceptual ascriptions. Erkenntnis, 82:513–
530.
Bourget, D. (2017b). Representationalism and sensory modalities: an argu-
ment for intermodal representationalism. American Philosophical Quar-
terly, 54:251–268.
Bourget, D. (2017c). Why are some phenomenal experiences ’vivid’ and oth-
ers ’faint’? representationalism, imagery, and cognitive phenomenology.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(4):673–687.
Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D. J. (2014). What Do Philosophers Believe?
Philosophical Studies, 170:465–500.
Bourget, D. and Mendelovici, A. (2014). Tracking representationalism. In
Bailey, A., editor, Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers, pages 209–235.
Continuum.
50
Brewer, B. (2007). Perception and its Objects. Philosophical Studies,
132(1):87–97.
Brogaard, B. (2012). Seeing as a non-experiental mental state: The case from
synesthesia and visual imagery. In Brown, R., editor, Consciousness Inside
and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience.
Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
Brogaard, B. (2013). DoWe Perceive Natural Kind Properties? Philosophical
Studies, 162(1):35–42.
Brogaard, B. (2015). Perceptual reports. In Matthen, M., editor, Oxford
Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
Brown, S. et al. (1916). On the interpretation of symptoms in the infec-
tive exhaustive psychoses. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,
43(6):518–531.
Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review, 110(2):199–
240.
Byrne, A. and Logue, H. (2008). Either/or. In Haddock, A. and Macpher-
son, F., editors, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, volume 29,
pages 314–19. Oxford University Press.
Byrne, A. and Tye, M. (2006). Qualia ain’t in the head. Noûs, 40(2):241–255.
Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
51
Chalmers, D. J. (2004). The representational character of experience. In
Leiter, B., editor, The Future for Philosophy, pages 153–181. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2006). Perception and the fall from eden. In Gendler, T. S.
and Hawthorne, J., editors, Perceptual Experience, pages 49–125. Oxford
University Press.
Child, W. (1992). Vision and Experience: The Causal Theory and the Dis-
junctive Conception. Philosophical Quarterly, 42(168):297–316.
Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic Structures. Mouton.
Chomsky, N. (1995). Language and Nature. Mind, 104(413):1–61.
Coburn, R. C. (1977). Intentionality and perception. Mind, 86(January):1–
18.
Crane, T. (2003). The intentional structure of consciousness. In Smith,
Q. and Jokic, A., editors, Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives,
pages 33–56. Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. (2009). Is perception a propositional attitude? Philosophical
Quarterly, 59(236):452–469.
Davidson, D. (1967). The logical form of action sentences. In Rescher, N.,
editor, The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh University Press.
52
Dretske, F. (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago
Press.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
First, M. B., Spitzer, R. L., Gibbon, M., and Williams, J. B. W. (1997).
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I), Clin-
ician Version, User’s Guide. American Psychiatric Club.
Fish, W. (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford University
Press.
Forbes, G. (2002). Intensionality: Graeme forbes. Aristotelian Society Sup-
plementary Volume, 76(1):75–99.
Forbes, G. (2006). Attitude Problems. Oxford University Press.
Forbes, G. (2008). Intensional Transitive Verbs. In Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Genone, J. (2014). Appearance and illusion. Mind, 123(490):339–376.
Genone, J. (forthcoming). Recent work on naive realism. American Philo-
sophical Quarterly.
Grice, H. P. (1961). The causal theory of perception, part i. Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, 121:121–152.
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press.
53
Grzankowski, A. (2016). Attitudes towards objects. Noûs, 50(2):314–328.
Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Per-
spectives, 4:31–52.
Hellie, B. (2007). Factive phenomenal characters. Philosophical Perspectives,
21(1):259–306.
Hellie, B. (2010). An externalist’s guide to inner experience. In Nanay, B.,
editor, Perceiving the World, pages 97–145. Oxford University Press.
Hill, C. S. (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Hintikka, J. (1969). The Logic of Perception. In Hintikka, J., editor, Models
for Modalities. Reidel.
Hinton, J. M. (1967). Visual Experiences. Mind, 76(April):217–227.
Jackson, F. (2004). Representation and experience. In Clapin, H., Staines, P.,
and Slezak, P., editors, Representation in Mind, pages 107–124. Elsevier.
Kriegel, U. (2007). Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.
Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1):307–340.
Langsam, H. (1997). The theory of appearing defended. Philosophical Stud-
ies, 87(1):33–59.
Logue, H. (2011). The skeptic and the naïve realist. Philosophical Issues,
21(1):268–288.
54
Logue, H. (2012). Why naive realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
112(2pt2):211–237.
Lycan, W. G. (1987). Phenomenal objects: A backhanded defense. Philo-
sophical Perspectives, 3(n/a):513–26.
Lycan, W. G. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press.
Lycan, W. G. (2001). The case for phenomenal externalism. Philosophical
Perspectives, 15(s15):17–35.
Martin, M. G. F. (2004). The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies,
120(1-3):37–89.
Martin, M. G. F. (2006). On Being Alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler and
John Hawthorne, editors, Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
Matthen, M. P. (1989). Intensionality and perception: A reply to rosenberg.
Journal of Philosophy, 86(December):727–733.
Mendelovici, A. (2013). Intentionalism about moods. Thought: A Journal
of Philosophy, 2(1):126–136.
Mendelovici, A. (2014). Pure intentionalism about moods and emotions. In
Kriegel, U., editor, Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, pages
135–157. Routledge.
Moltmann, F. (2008). Intensional verbs and their intentional objects. Natural
Language Semantics, 16(3):239–270.
55
Montague, R. (1973). The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary
English. In Patrick Suppes, Julius Moravcsik, and Jaakko Hintikka, ed-
itors, Approaches to Natural Language, volume 49, pages 221–242. Dor-
drecht.
Moore, G. E. (1905). The nature and reality of the objects of perception.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 6:68–127.
Nanay, B. (2012). Perceiving tropes. Erkenntnis, 77(1):1–14.
Pautz, A. (2009). A Simple View of Consciousness. In Robert C. Koons and
George Bealer, editors, The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, pages
25–66. Oxford University Press.
Pautz, A. (2010a). An Argument for the Intentional View of Visual Expe-
rience. In Bence Nanay, editor, Perceiving the World. Oxford University
Press.
Pautz, A. (2010b). Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?
In Bence Nanay, editor, Perceiving the World, pages 254–309. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Pietroski, P. (2009). Logical form. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Prerost, F. J., Sefcik, D., Smith, B. D., et al. (2014). Differential diagnosis
of patients presenting with hallucinations. Osteopathic Family Physician,
6(2).
56
Rosenberg, A. (1989). Perceptual presentations and biological function: A
comment on matthen. Journal of Philosophy, 86(January):38–44.
Schellenberg, S. (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual
Experience. Philosophical Studies, 149(1):19–48.
Schellenberg, S. (2011). Perceptual content defended. Noûs, 45(4):714–750.
Schellenberg, S. (2014). The relational and representational character of per-
ceptual experience. In Brogaard, B., editor, Does Perception Have Content,
pages 199–219. OUP.
Schellenberg, S. (2016). Perceptual particularity. Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research, 92(2).
Schiffer, S. (1990). The Mode-of-Presentation Problem. In Anderson
J. Owens, C. A., editor, Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content
in Logic, Language, and Mind, pages 249–268. CSLI.
Seager, W. E. and Bourget, D. (2007). Representationalism about conscious-
ness. In Velmans, M. and Schneider, S., editors, The Blackwell Companion
to Consciousness, pages 261–276. Blackwell.
Siegel, S. (2006). Which properties are represented in perception? In
Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J., editors, Perceptual Experience, pages
481–503. Oxford University Press.
Siegel, S. (2010). The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford.
57
Smythies, J. R. (1956). Analysis Of Perception. London,: Routledge &Amp;
K Paul,.
Snowdon, P. F. (1980). Perception, Vision, and Causation. Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, 81:175–92.
Snowdon, P. F. (1990). The objects of perceptual experience. Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, 64:121–50.
Soames, S. (2003). Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century Vol. 2:
The Age of Meaning. Princeton University Press.
Sosa, E. (2010). Knowing Full Well. Princeton University Press.
Speaks, J. (2009). Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Percep-
tual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(3):539–573.
Speaks, J. (2010). Attention and Intentionalism. Philosophical Quarterly,
60(239):325–342.
Speaks, J. (2015a). Is phenomenal character out there in the world? Philos-
ophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(2):465–482.
Speaks, J. (2015b). The Phenomenal and the Representational. Oxford Uni-
versity Press Uk.
Strawson, P. F. (1974). Causation in Perception. In Freedom and Resent-
ment. Methuen.
58
Sturgeon, S. (2008). Disjunctivism About Visual Experience. In Adrian Had-
dock and Fiona Macpherson, editors, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action,
Knowledge, pages 112–143. Oxford University Press.
Tye, M. (1995a). A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal
character. Philosophical Perspectives, 9:223–39.
Tye, M. (1995b). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory
of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2002). Representationalism and the transparency of experience.
Noûs, 36(1):137–51.
Tye, M. (2003a). Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity. MIT
Press.
Tye, M. (2003b). Consciousness, color, and content. Philosophical Studies,
113(3):233–235.
Tye, M. (2007). Intentionalism and the argument from no common content.
Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1):589–613.
Tye, M. (2008). The experience of emotion: An intentionalist theory. Revue
Internationale de Philosophie, 62:25–50.
Tye, M. (2015). Yes, phenomenal character really is out there in the world.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(2):483–488.
59
Westerståhl, D. (2011). Generalized Quantifiers. In Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy.
Zwicky, A. and Sadock, J. (1975). Ambiguity tests and how to fail them.
Syntax and semantics, 4(1):1–36.
60
